Extraordinary Colour Footage of Operation Charnwood

Some fantastic footage of 'Operation Charnwood' and the struggle to take control of Caen has been brought to my attention. The footage depicts both the Allies and the German formations fighting bitterly around the city. Having visited the area to the north of Caen where my Grandfather first saw action in the area of St. Contest-Galamanche, this footage features a very similar landscape to that which I walked across, the difference being I wasn't being shelled!

A Scot From Stoke - With The Royal Scots Fusiliers (August 1944 to December 1945)

My Grandfather's military record shows that following the disbandment of 59 (Staffordshire) Division he was formally transferred to the 11th Battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers on 26th August 1944.

As I previously did whilst researching his time in the Staffordshire Regiments, my first point of contact was the Regimental Museum, now The Regimental Museum of the Royal Highland Fusiliers, located on Sauchiehall Street in the centre of Glasgow, The researchers there were extremely helpful and provided some excellent source material to get me started on this the next part of 'the fragmented history'.

Army Book 358, The Register Of Soldiers of the Royal Scots Fusiliers revealed that he was indeed a soldier of the regiment until the date of his release to the Reserve, recorded in the Register Of Soldiers as 5th March 1946 (a date reported elsewhere, his MOD record as 6th March 1946).

Army Book 358

Register of Soldiers of the R.S.F.

My Grandfather's entry in the Register of Soldiers

The Falaise Pocket And The Demise of A German Army

A road in the Falaise Pocket choked with bodies and destroyed vehicles

As the South Staffordshire regiments were coming to terms with the news that the 59^th Division and their associated regiments were to be disbanded, the encirclement of German Army Group B was nearing completion.

The last action in which the 5^th South Staffordshire Regiment engaged the enemy in the Menil Hermai and Rabodanges area took them  some 9 miles south of Falaise in positions approximately equidistant from Falaise and Argentan, towns near to the mouth of the notorious ‘Falaise Pocket’.

Given the involvement of the 59 (Staffordshire) division in the encirclement, it is appropriate to describe some of the drama that played out in the Falaise-Argentan sector. The Battle of Falaise brought the Battle of Normandy to a conclusion and the liberation of Paris on the 25^th August closed Operation Overlord.

The town of Faliase was also an entry on the envelope upon which my Grandfather detailed his passage across north west Europe.

Operation Cobra in July had allowed the huge US forces to breakout of the Normandy bridgehead into Brittany enabling rapid progress to the south and south east by General Patton’s 3^rd Army, now unhindered by the Normandy bocage. To the north, the 1^st Canadian Army were pressing south east from Caen towards Falaise whilst the 2^nd British Army maintained pressure further west.

Location of opposing forces in the area of  Falaise between 8th to 17th August 1944

(image: EyeSerene)

Plans were afoot to trap the German forces to the west of the Seine. The original plan was to execute a long encirclement with 21^st Army Group (1^st Canadian and 2^nd British armies) pivoting to the left from Falaise to reach the Seine whilst US 3^rd Army would block a breakout to the south, thereby trapping German Army Group B (the 7^th German Army and the 5^th Panzer Army) between the rivers Seine and Loire.

The German High Command recognised the risk of encirclement and Hitler responded to the threat by ordering Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge to punch a hole in the US 1^st Army front in a major offensive action between Mortain and Avranches.

Of this offensive Hitler wrote 

‘The decision in the Battle of France depends on the success of the Avraches attack. The commander in the west has a unique opportunity, which will never return, to drive into an extremely exposed enemy area and thereby to change the situation completely’.

The offensive was launched on 7^th August. The Allies, forewarned by Ultra information, neutralised the attack within 24 hours and the action, known as Operation Lüttich, ceased on 10^th August. The intended breakout failed and only served to drive the German armour of Army Group B deeper into the pocket.

In the immediate wake of Operation Lüttich, General Bradley recorded 

‘This is an opportunity that comes to a commander not more than once in a century. We’re about to destroy an entire hostile army and go all the way from here to the German border’.

Operation Totalise and then Operation Tractable took the Canadians into the town of Falaise which was secured by the 17^th August. On the same day Hitler relieved von Kluge of his command and replaced him with Feldmarschall Walter Model. Von Kluge, blamed for the failure of the German Army in the west and implicated in the 20^th July plot to assassinate Hitler, committed suicide in Metz two days later.

Back in the field, XV US Corps, which formed the lower jaw of the trap reached positions overlooking the town of Argentan. The possibility existed to close the gap with the coming together of the Canadians and Poles from the north and the Americans from the south. However, Patton’s orders to advance beyond Argentan were countermanded by General Bradley. The rationale for this decision has been hotly debated since 1944.

Numerous reasons have been given for the order to stop the XV advance that would close the pocket thereby cutting off the escape route to the east for the remaining forces of the 7^th German Army and the 5^th Panzer Army.

One explanation proffered by Bradley himself after the war stated that a meeting of the British/Canadian and US units between Falaise and Argentan would have been a ‘dangerous and uncontrollable maneuver’ which in the words of General Eisenhower might have resulted in a ‘calamatous battle between friends’. Alternatively, the delicate politics associated with maintaining the Allied coalition may have lead to a reluctance to order US forces across the international army boundary. A thoroughly feasible reason was a purely military consideration. Four divisions of US XV Corps were extended over a broad front. To further thin the line in order to close the gap posed a considerable risk given that the remnants of no less than nineteen German divisions were poised to ‘stampede’ east to escape the pocket. This could have lead to the annihilation of the Corps. Bradley also said of this decision that he would prefer to have ‘a solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise’.

Closure of the Pocket 17th to 21st August 1944

(note the position of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division at the base of the Pocket

On 17^th August the Allies proceeded to close the gap. On 18^th August the 4^th Canadian Armoured Division seized the village of Trun whilst formations of the Polish Armoured Division captured Chambois, meeting up with US and French troops coming from the south.

Whilst in a desperate predicament, the German forces continued to show a great tenacity in battle. On 19^th August an armoured column of 2^nd Panzer Division broke through the line in the Canadian held position at St Lambert. In doing so they facilitated the escape of thousands of troops by keeping the road open for a full six hours until darkness fell. In this time, other units converged in the Dives river which ran across the mouth of the pocket.

On the 19^th August, the Poles moved north east from Chambois to take the high ground of Hill 262 from where they could direct accurate artillery fire onto the German armoured columns formed up in the pocket. On the same day, elements of two Panzer divisions launched attacks on the Polish positions from outside of the pocket whilst from the interior further Panzer divisions broke through the Polish lines and opened up a corridor through which an estimated 10,000 further German troops escaped. The linking of Polish and Canadian forces on 21^st August finally closed the gap and sealed the pocket.

The encirclement of the remaining forces of German Army Group B was without doubt a decisive and crushing defeat. In the chaos of those August days an accurate determination of the extent of the German losses was not possible and estimates vary widely depending on the source of the information. However, in general terms it is accepted that between 80,000 to 100,000 troops were encircled within the pocket of whom 10,000 to 15,000 were killed, 40,000 to 50,000 were taken prisoner of war and an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 escaped to the east out of the pocket.

On visiting the Falaise area shortly after the conclusion of the action General Eisenhower described the scene thus 

‘The battlefield at Falaise was unquestioningly one of the greatest ‘killing fields’ of any of the war areas. Forty eight hours after the closing of the gap I was conducted through it on foot, to encounter scenes that could be described only by Dante. It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards at a time, stepping on nothing but dead and decaying flesh’.

Devastating though the losses to the German army were in terms of men, armour and other essential equipment, the fact that between 20,000 and 50,000 men were able to escape out of the pocket prior to the closure was crucial. Regrouped, these men were to form the basis of the determined and effective resistance that the Allies were to experience as the fighting continued in the direction of Berlin, across Belgium and Holland.

Disbandment – The End of 59 (Staffordshire) Division

'To the greater glory of God and in memory of those who died whilst serving with the 59th Staffordshire division. 1939 -1945'.

'This plaque is a duplicate of that erected on the battlefield at Thury Harcourt in Normandy'.

Stafford Park

The Battalions that together made up the 59 (Staffordshire) Division were informed of the decision to disband the formation between 18^th and 20^th August.

After four years of preparation leading to the execution of all they had learned across the battlefields of Normandy the disbandment came as a bitter blow. The rationale for the decision was however logical. All of the British regiments engaged in the Normandy campaign had been badly mauled in the ten weeks of fighting since D Day. Of the Divisions in the field, the 59^th was a junior formation recreated at the outbreak of the war and it was for this reason that it was sacrificed in order to replenish the ranks of longer established regiments within other Divisions. Thus the men of the 59^th were dispersed and transferred into reinforcement hungry English, Welsh and Scottish regiments.

It was on the 29^th August that my Grandfather was transferred into the 11^th Battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. This was a regiment that had fought cheek by jowl alongside the South Staffords, nost notably at Fontenay le Pesnel and Noyers.

After the war, Major General L. O. Lyne, Divisional Commanding Officer of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division described how he received the news of the decision to disband the formation.

‘Field Marshall Montgomery wrote to me and told me the sad news that, because of the acute shortage of trained reserves, particularly in the infantry, it would be necessary to break up 59 Division. He had selected us for one reason only; that we were the junior division and a war-formed one at that. I could not of course question the decision, but it was with a heavy heart that I faced the problem of how best to achieve this end without lowering morale. I went over as soon as possible to the Commander-in-Chief and gave him conditions, to which he readily agreed, on which I could best carry out his orders’

And his personal feelings on his time as the Divisional C.O. he continued;

‘I realised in this period how very fond I had grown of 59 Division. They had always had a fine esprit-de-corps and pride in themselves, and I had seen them develop into one of the hardest fighting divisions in the Army Group. Everything that they were asked to do was undertaken in the same spirit of dogged determination to succeed. It was always a great pleasure and pride to me to hear, as I so often did, from other Divisional Commanders during the remainder of the campaign, what a high opinion they had of drafts from 59 Division.’

Accolades were also poured upon the men of the South Staffordshire Regiments within the Division. The last comments on the conduct of the South Staffords in the struggle I will leave to two officers of my Grandfather’s 5^th Battalion.

Major Pearson wrote, ‘It was a bitter pill to swallow, but with a job well done and in the true Staffordshire spirit of ‘We’ll show ‘em’ those who remained able to fight left the battalion and, with heads high in the air, joined their new battalions with the knowledge that they were respected fighters wherever they might serve.’

He continued, ‘So for the time being ended the history of a great fighting battalion who, against great odds, upheld the highest traditions of the regiment and the county. Whenever the battle of Normandy is mentioned only the highest praise can be spoken of the gallant Staffordshires.’

A former adjutant of the 5^th Battalion, Captain A.E. Scrimshaw, wrote to the then Mayor of Walsall concerning the decision to disband the Division.

‘We must feel however, that if our dispersal was necessary, to hasten the success of our arms, the sacrifice, great though it was, has not been in vain. We remember with pride the men of our regiment who have fallen in the fight, who, in their turn, were proud to wear the South Staffordshires’ badge, and we look forward to a rebirth at the earliest possible moment.’

'To the officers men and women

of Staffordshire units and all

other Staffordshire men and

women who gave their lives

for their country in the

War of 1939 -1945 '

The Last Action of the 59th - 5th Battalion in Menil Vin and Rabodanges

The 5th Battalion were involved in the last offensive action of the Staffordhire Regiments in Normandy.

Having secured Fresnay, the Battalion advanced to the river achieving a crossing on 16th August approximately two miles to the south of Thury Harcourt by way of a small ferry. Resistance coming from the town had largely been subdued over the previous few days as a result of an attack on the stronghold on by the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment. With the crossing effected by the 5th South Staffords to the south and the news that the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers had reached Le Grand Donnay some four miles south east of Thury Harcourt the defenders of the town feared being cut off from the main body of the retreat. Upon crossing the only opposition encountered by the 5th came from a few snipers in the rear guard, who were put to flight by returning fire. Those that did not flee surrendered and were taken prisoner.

The next strongpoint objective had been identified as the small settlements of Menil Hermai and Rabodanges, also on the Orne approximately twenty miles to the south east of Thury Harcourt. 'A' and 'B' Companies under Major Grey and Major Smallwood respectively were to capture Menil Hermei village in an attack supported by tank and artillery. However, upon advancing on the objective, after the artillery ceased firing, the village was found to be clear of the enemy. The Germans were replaced by French villagers who filled the main street to celebrate in such numbers that the tanks were prevented from moving forward.

French girls pour a drink for a British soldier in Vernon, 25 August 1944 © IWM (BU 59).

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205206794

'A' and 'B' Companies were ordered to hold Menil Hermei against a possible counterattack and to provide a secure base for 'C' and 'D' Companies who were to attack the village of Rabodanges and the nearby objective high ground of Point 206. 'C' Company (under Major Hall) and 'D' Company (under Major McIntyre) advanced along the Menil Hermei-Rabodanges road screened by carriers. When the leading carrier was destroyed after hitting a mine, this signaled the commencement of the German defensive response with heavy fire brought down upon the two Companies from every weapon available. Regardless, the attack Companies forged ahead and achieved contact with the enemy. Fighting raged for several hours before 'C' and 'D' Companies were ordered to consolidate the gains and dig in a short distance from Point 206.

The fighting had left the Companies short of ammunition such that a counterattack would have had grave consequences. It was the courageous actions of one Captain Graham Ellis, who with a pioneer platoon, cleared a path through mines whilst under heavy fire, that allowed desperately needed ammunition to be brought up the line. For this feat Captain Ellis was awarded the Military Cross. He was later killed in action. The anticipated counterattack never came, in part as a result of aggressive patrolling and heavy artillery fire brought down on the known German positions throughout the night.

It was on the 21st August after further artillery 'softening up' of the Point 206 objective that the high ground was taken . The Germans attempted to dislodge the 5th Battalion from Point 206 with heavy fire from their long range guns, but no counterattack was put in by the infantry.

In this way the last battle of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division concluded with the enemy encircled in the Falaise area and focused only on their efforts escape from the jaws of the 'Pocket' that the Allied armies had created.

The South Staffordshire Regiments In The Orne Bridgehead

Map indicating the positions of opposing forces in the Orne Bridgehead 6th to 9th August 1944

(with thanks to http://59div.morssweb.com/)

As previously observed by Colonel Douglas, the units of the 59th Division suffered very badly in their repeated attempts to capture the village of Noyers. However, at this point in the campaign it was necessary to maintain the offensive and to this end the South Staffordshire Regiments were destined to suffer even greater casualty numbers in the last three weeks of the Division’s existence.

From the beginning of August, the tide was turning in Normandy as the ability of the German forces to oppose an enemy having  almost complete control of the air and such an overwhelming superiority in equipment was nearing its end. Cracks started to appear in the German defences which ultimately opened up to the extent that the entire German 7th Army and the 5th Panzer Army (albeit much depleted in strength) became encircled by British, Canadian and U.S. forces and were annihilated in the infamous ‘Falaise Pocket’. However, at the beginning of the month this dramatic demise of the German forces in France was three weeks off and the 59th were faced with many more days of hard fighting yet.

In that first week of August, all the regiments of South Staffordshire were moved forward towards the Orne River in what were to be the final series of actions in which they fought as part of the 59 Division.

The prominent role in the advance to the western banks of the Orne and the subsequent formation and defence of the bridgehead was taken up by the 7th South Staffordshire Regiment of 176 Brigade. Orders were received late on the evening of 3rd August that the 7th were to launch an attack towards the Villers Bocage. In doing so the decision was taken to advance across country towards the village as the road was known to be heavily mined. In order to advance in this manner, specialised tanks were brought up which were capable of launching 40 lb T.N.T. charges that cleared the high hedges and banks of the bocage whilst armoured bulldozers cleared the debris to create passages through which the infantry could pass.

The infantry companies began the advance in the early morning of 4th August. From gathered intelligence it was anticipated that resistance would be very light as the enemy had withdrawn from the area, but in doing so had made good use of mines and booby traps laid and set with the intention of impeding the British progress as much as possible.

In the shattered village of Villers Bocage the only inhabitants encountered by the advancing units were discovered to be German wounded and the nursing staff that were tending to them.

By 4 pm the main road from Tilly had been cleared of mines, but the forward movement resulted in gridlock for the mass of transport attempting to move through the area. With the enemy nowhere in sight, orders were passed down to the forward companies of 7th Battalion to advance towards and to occupy a series of prominent positions approximately 10 miles distant from the River Orne.

The fact that contact with the enemy had been lost was a cause for concern within the British command. In order to confirm the enemy’s withdrawal, the divisional ‘Recce’ units headed out in the pre-dawn of 5th August in the direction of the river. Their intelligence reports did indeed confirm that nothing of the enemy was in evidence to the west of the river, other than signs of a hasty retreat, and that the Germans had crossed over the Orne.

By 4 pm that day the forward formations reached the high ground that overlooked the Orne valley and they were able to establish that the stone bridge at La Bas, the only crossing point, had been blown up by the Germans once they had crossed over.

Along roads that ran parallel to those taken by 7th Battalion, but shifted approximately three miles to the south, the formations of 177 Brigade approached and reached the river. By 7 pm the Brigade had concentrated. From the concentration area, the battalions of 177 had gained a good vantage point from which they were able to observe the hurried preparation of new German defensive positions.

The topography of the River Orne was a critical consideration to the Division as they 176 planned the crossing, The river itself runs its course in this area through a deep and narrow valley, the western banks of which are very steep and thickly covered with undergrowth. The river is approximately 50 feet wide and fordable in several places. In contrast the eastern slopes are shallower and the land that runs up from the banks of the river to the dense Grimbosq Forest features orchards, small farms and villages. The forest was approximately two miles wide and one mile deep. The existence of this wooded land directly opposite the planned bridgehead would later offer cover for enemy troop concentrations from which attacks on the bridgehead positions could be launched.

Prior to the crossing, night patrols had identified a couple of crossing points for the troops. The 'War Story' account described how one of them was established, 'in one area the height of the banks was measured by lowering a six-foot officer by his heels from the edge of the bank until he touched water below'. 176 Brigade now had a place to cross where the men would be able to wade across to the opposite bank which a ‘recce’ by Lieutenant Ball, accompanied by a Canadian officer, had established was only lightly defended. However, this would be without supporting armour which due to the steep banks could only cross in the area of La Bas and with the bridge destroyed it would be for the Royal Engineers to position and secure a Bailey bridge next to the blown stone bridge as quickly as possible.

With the South Staffordshire forces congregated across the western banks of the Orne the infantry units dug in whilst small and medium calibre guns were moved up with all possible speed in order to support the soldiers as they made the crossing.

With the 7th Battalion in position on the west bank of the river, the sister Battalions of the regiment, the 1/6th, 2/6th and the 5th) moved forward on the 3rd August and concentrated around St Agneau le Malherbe some 8 miles to the west of the Orne.

Orders received on the morning of 6th August determined that the 7th Battalion of 176 Brigade would be the first formation to cross over the river and it was their daunting task to establish the bridgehead on the opposite bank facing the villages of Grimbosq and Brieux. Their companion Battalions of 176 Brigade, the 6th North Staffords and the 7th Royal Norfolks would follow and expand the bridgehead. The bridgehead would have to be held against the inevitable German counter attacks by the men of 176 Brigade until a Bailey bridge could be brought up the line and set in place to allow further passage of infantry and armour into the bridgehead. Tank support was available, but the wooded slopes of the eastern bank put their effectiveness in support in doubt.

The bridge near La Bas viewed from the west bank of the Orne, 1944

The intensity of troop movements on the western banks of the river did not go unnoticed by the Germans who responded to the threat by laying down mortar fire on the opposite bank. However, for once the shelling had no significant detrimental impact upon the attackers.

The timing for the start of the assault for the units of the 7th South Staffordshires was set to be 2 o’clock in the afternoon and was heralded by a bombardment by 4.2 inch mortars. The crossing was achieved for few casualties, but the opposition stiffened once the opposite bank had been reached. Battalion objectives were in the village of Grimbosq, but in order to achieve them, the companies of the 7th were to form a rough square on the eastern side of the river with ‘B’ and ‘A’ Companies facing the German line with ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies behind them. This position was attained by about 6 pm on 6th August.

Battalion H.Q., up to this point established in a chateau on the opposite bank, forded the river as darkness fell since their original position was drawing enemy fire and this resulted in a number of casualties. The new Battalion H.Q. position was established alongside ‘C’ Company between the river and the village of Grimbosq. At this point in the action, the German response to the crossing was very muted.

By now, the bridgehead had been successfully expanded with the companies of 7th Battalion established with the 6th North Staffords on their right flank and the 7th Royal Norfolks to their right. In the meantime, transporters were bringing up the Bailey bridge and supporting artillery were positioned on the opposite bank.

As dawn broke on the 7th the Germans had re-established a grip on the new situation and put in a savage counter attack. In the face of such heavy enemy shelling the casualty tally started to mount, but with the river to their immediate rear evacuation of the wounded to the casualty clearing stations behind the forward lines was near impossible.

In the environs of Grimbosq village ‘B’ Company lost their commanding officer, Major Gilbert, to a grenade whilst ‘C’ Company found themselves surrounded by the enemy on several occasions. Despite this determined defence the companies of the 7th held their positions.

Radio communication was limited but the attacking units did learn that the enemy had managed to establish a thin defensive line of infantry around the entire perimeter of the bridgehead. It was also understood that a significant element of an S.S. Panzer Division (KG Wünsche) were forming up in Grimbosq Forest immediately to the rear of the German front line.

Throughout the night the engineers had continued their endeavours to ensure that more equipment, ammunition and armour was able to cross the Orne. On the morning of 7th August the men of 176 Brigade were bolstered by the appearance of heavy 17-pounder self-propelled guns and tanks that had crossed the Bailey bridge under cover of darkness. Gunners manning the medium range artillery batteries sent salvos into Grimbosq Forest where enemy infantry formations were concentrating in anticipation of a counter attack. Efforts of the enemy to organise were further hampered by the diligence of observers from 1/6th, 2/6th and 5th Battalions (177 Brigade), then to the south of the bridgehead, who ensured that the artillery fire was brought down in the right places with maximum effect.

The blown bridge at Las Bas seen from a Bailey Bridge that enabled passage of armour into the bridgehead, 1944

The fighting continued and over time and 176 Brigade lost many men, killed or wounded. Those who remained uninjured were suffering from the effects of such a period of continuous combat. Whilst offensive actions were occurring across the front line, the heavy artillery barrage supporting an attack in the vicinity of Caen could be heard to the north from about 9 in the evening. It was hoped that this particular attack would offer some relief to those fighting in the Grimbosq bridgehead. At the same time the beleaguered Brigade received a boost to their morale when six rocket firing typhoon aircraft appeared and dealt a German tank concentration a devastating and deadly blow. As night fell heavy bombers flew over the positions held by the Staffords and flashes of high explosives dropped in support of a distant Canadian assault lit the night sky.

For a period of time the bridgehead battlefield became quieter, but as midnight approached the Germans renewed their efforts to dislodge the Brigade and drive them back across the Orne. Very lights announced concentrated mortar fire and the fighting continued throughout the night, all night, with some incursions into the Brigade positions that failed to lead to a German breakthrough. As dawn finally broke the soldiers took their first food on board for many hours, a meagre meal of cold sausage and army biscuit. The respite was short lived however as the enemy renewed the fight opening up with the feared Nebelwerfer, better known to the British as ‘moaning minnies’, a reflection of the characteristic howl of their incoming missiles. From the scant shelter of their slit trenches the men of 176 Brigade, somewhat revived by the hastily taken breakfast, continued to repulse the determined counterattacks. 

A Churchill tank of the 107th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps with the bridge visible in the background, 1944

The battle raged on throughout the daylight hours of the 8th August until the 7th South Staffords were relieved in the line. Their neighbours in the bridgehead, the 6th North Staffords and the 7th Royal Norfolks, likewise moved back to the battalion rest area behind the medium range guns.

In the fighting described above, the 7th Battalion were badly mauled to the extent that the action within the Orne bridgehead marked the end of the 7th Battalion, the surviving members of which were transferred to other units after a 48 hour period of rest. So heavy were their losses over the 7th and 8th August that there were insufficient reinforcements to preserve the Battalion as a fighting formation.

Memorial to the men of 59 (Staffordshire) Division and the Royal Artillery commemorating the liberation of the La Bas bridge over the River Orne on 8th August 1944

59 (Staffordshire) Division Advance Towards The Orne

Soldiers of 59 (Staffordshire) Division advancing through Calvados

Consequent to Operation Pomegranate the German forces were concentrated across the 21st Army Group front opposite Caen and Villers-Bocage. The overall plan for 59 Infantry Division was, within XII Corps, to defeat the enemy formations in Villers-Bocage before advancing to the south west towards the River Orne to force a crossing if at all possible.

In this advance, 59 Division were in the centre of the line and were flanked by 50 Infantry Division to their right and 53 Infantry Division on their left. As 59 Division moved towards the Orne, XIII Corps maintained the pressure on the enemy with a southward attack towards Caumont and Mont Pincon (the highest point in the Calvados Department) in 'Operation Bluecoat'.

The 59 Division advance started with a 197 Brigade action in the Juvigny area, approximately three miles to the north of Noyers. Tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment were in support. The attack progressed  well and thorough patrols were maintained to ensure that enemy withdrawals did not go unnoticed. A German counter attack in the same area was repelled by the 7th Royal Warwicks.

By 1st August the 197 Bridage sector had quietened down to the extent that the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers were withdrawn, but an increase in enemy activity rapidly brought them back into the line. Fierce local fighting continued and in three days of combat the toll on 197 Brigade was high at 19 officers and 383 other ranks killed, wounded or missing. However, the German armour was held in the area well away from the U.S. advance further to the west.

From 3rd August intelligence reports indicated significant enemy withdrawals were taking place from the XII Corps front and the formations of 59 Division pressed the advance towards the Orne. 197 Brigade were in action once again, advancing to take the high ground to the immediate north east of Villers-Bocage. Resistance was light, but rear guard pockets of Germans along with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines continued to hamper the progress of the British soldiers. By 3pm on 4th August, one company of the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers entered the ruins of Villers-Bocage, where the R.A.F. had completed the destruction started by the artillery. 176 Brigade passed through the village.

Scenes of devastation in Villers-Bogage after the fighting of July 1944

Meanwhile, 177 Brigade finally occupied Noyers which had eluded them over the previous weeks and taken such a heavy toll across its ranks. By night, 176 Brigade controlled the high ground five miles to the south east of Villers-Bocage. 59 Recce Regiment were to be found in Landes, three miles to the east of the village and 177 were positioned on the road between Villers-Bocage and Noyers. 197 were now in reserve.

At this point, the 59th suffered a blow when 31 Tank Brigade were replaced by 34 Tank Brigade under the divisional command. Thus a close tank crew/infantry understanding that had developed in the previous two weeks of fighting was lost. This loss of learnt close cooperation would result in an increase in casualty figures within the Division in the coming days.

49 (West Riding) Division Memorial, Fontenay-le-Pesnel

Memorial to the 49 (West Riding) Division

Fontenay-le-Pesnel

Just at the point of the turn off to the Fontenay-le-Pesnel War Cemetery stands an imposing monument to the men of the 49 (West Riding) Division, 'The Polar Bears' and the sacrifices they made in the fighting of 1944 and 1945,

Detail from the 49 (West Riding) Division monument

The walls of the monument carry separate memorials to the Brigades of the Division including the 147 Division to which Jim Heath was transferred, as part of 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers, on 29th August 1944 upon the disbandment of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division.

The plaque to 147 Division can be seen towards the end of this short piece of video footage of the monument.

The Divisional Cemetery At Fontenay-le-Pesnel

It was under a louring sky in May 2014 that my friend and I paid a visit to the Divisional Cemetery at Fontenay-le-Pesnel. Located 16 kilometers to the west of Caen, the cemetery is the final resting place of 460 Commonwealth soldiers of which 452 are identified.

Entrance to Fontenay-le-Pesnel War Cemetery 10th

10th May 2014

Immediately striking in the grounds of the cemetery is the profusion of headstones bearing the knot of the South Staffordshire Regiment. Of these, the majority carry the dates of the fighting during Operation Pomegranate, many of these men would have fallen in the repeated attempts to capture Noyers.

In addition, many men of the East Lancashire and the Royal Warwickshire Regiments as well as the Durham Light Infantry are commemorated in Fontenay-le-Pesnel War Cemetery.

It is near impossible to take in the details of each headstone, but one struck me as particularly sad. The headstone gave the details of a Private K.P. Mitton of the South Staffordshire Regiment who was killed on the 16th July 1944 at the age of 18. Towards the bottom of the headstone and you can see that his brother Flight Sergeant Harold Bertram of the R.A.F., killed in action on 11th February 1941, also lies here.

The cemetery also contains 59 German military graves.

The Cross of Sacrifice

Fontenay-le-Pesnel War Cemetery

After the Battle Of Noyers

As described earlier, the prize of the village of Noyers was not delivered into British hands during the fighting of 16th to 19th July, but in terms of the overriding aim of Operation Pomegranate it was considered to be a successful action. The Battle had, as intended, drawn the enemy away from the Caen sector and the U.S. forces then looking to break out at the base of the Cotentin peninsula.

Throughout the Battle of Noyers the men continued to learn combat skills that were to be critical to their survival such as the importance of close collaboration between infantry and the supporting tank crews. Nevertheless, the casualty list was long and in all 59 Division recorded 1250 men killed, wounded or missing, a tally that mirrored the toll in the Battle for Caen earlier in the month.

The remainder of July was taken up with intense patrolling in the area. The full complement of the  three infantry brigades of 59 Division in the front line was achieved when 197 Brigade moved up to relieve 70 Infantry Brigade of the 49th (West Riding) Division in the area of Juvigny-Vendes on 21st July. The brigades of 59 Division each had two battalions in the line with one in reserve.

Under brigade command, squadrons of the 59th Recce Regiment moved into the line in order to allow the infantry to move into rest areas company by company. On 23rd July, 33 Armoured Brigade left the divisional area as 59 Division came under the command of XII Corps and 31 Tank Brigade came under the command of 59 Division.

'Oh I Do Like To Be Beside The Seaside!' - Redcar Summer 1941

Private Jim Heath 5051929 (right)

Redcar 1941

When my parents visited at Christmas I was exited to find out that another wartime photograph had been unearthed.

On the rear of the photograph, as was usual, the name of the studio is printed. It states:

'PICTORAL STUDIOS

THE ESPLANADE

REDCAR

FURTHER COPIES MAY BE HAD'

I believe that this puts a date on when this photograph was taken as the Summer of 1941 when the 59th Division had returned to the east coast of England to resume training.

Another Perspective on the Battle For Noyers - Colonel William Dewhurst Douglas 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers

Such was the scale of the Overlord operation and so numerous were the daily acts of individual heroism in the Normandy campaign that the deeds of some formations are not widely documented. Sadly, this is the case for the 59th (Staffordshire) Division. Aside from the 'It's War Story' and the 'Your Men In Battle' books, both now long out of print, references to the 59th are few and far between in the public domain.

However, the excellent archive held by the Imperial War Museum contains an interview of approximately two hours duration with one Colonel Douglas, an officer who served with the 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers in North West Europe between 1944 and 1945.

A formation within the 49 (West Riding) Division, the 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers fought alongside the 5th Battalion South Staffordshires during Operation Pomegranate. Indeed after the fighting in Normandy concluded the remnants of the 59th Division units were transferred to other Divisions. In this way my Grandfather was incorporated in the 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers for the remainder of the war. Reference is made to this transfer of the Staffords in Colonel Douglas' account below.

In this extract, Colonel Douglas describes his observations as the men of the 59th Division assaulted the station area of Noyers.

'It was around this time that I began patrolling. I think that by the and of the campaign I'd probably done more patrols than any other Lieutenant in the entire British Army. Anyway, I did my first recce patrol down a slope towards Noyers station where the enemy was supposed to be preparing a new position down at the far end of the slope to hold up our next advance and we had to find out what they were doing'.

'Which station?'

'Noyer, N-O-Y-E-R station, it may have an 'S' on it on some maps. Well we went down this slope, a very long one, about a mile, a mile and a half long this slope. Not a blade of grass on it, not a bush, nothing. It was a wide open, ex-cultivated field actually. We saw the enemy, they were wiring and they were digging trenches and you could hear them muttering and you could see the odd flash of a cigarette behind someones hand so we crawled back before daylight and reported all this and a great, tremendous bombardment was put on them that morning which apparently did them no good at all.

About this time, 'cos not a great deal was happening where we were, all we had to do was hold this ridge in readiness for the 59th Staffordshire Division, who were to come up through us with armour support and go down and capture the Noyers position. And we had time to wander about on top of this position and what impressed me at the time was how marvellous the German dug-outs were, I mean some of them were twenty or thirty feet into the ground. They were lined with sheets, they had tables, chairs, lamps, mind you they'd had four years to get them ready I suppose. It was just a great shame that they were all facing the wrong way because otherwise it would have been marvellous for us to go into.

Eventually, the poor old 59th Division set off in a daylight attack down the slope. And I wasn't a regular soldier at the time and as a mere platoon commander I had no great military knowledge I suppose, but even to me it seemed madness to send an entire Division down a slope that was a mile and a half long in broad daylight, in spite of all the shells and mortars and things going down hill. And it was hardly surprising the next day when we discovered that it had had so many casualties that the 59th Division was disbanded, they just couldn't replace all their losses.

We got one or two of their chaps, they were either North Staffs or South Staffs, they had quite incomprehensible accents but they were the most marvellous diggers that I'd ever come across. They were coal miners of course and they were brilliant at digging slit trenches. They could dig three trenches when you were half way down into your own, so in that respect they were a very great asset.'

59th Division and Operation Pomegranate

The positions of Allied and German formations at the outset of Operation Pomegranate

(map used with the kind permission of http://59div.morssweb.com)

On 14th July, the 59th concentrated in the area surrounding the villages of Loucelles, Christot and Fontenay-le-Pesnel in the centre of the Pomegranate offensive line. The 49th (West Riding) or ‘Polar Bear’ Division was positioned on the 59th’s right flank whilst the 53rd (Welsh) Division formed up on the left flank.

The battle opened up at 0530 hours on the morning of 16th July, so called 'H’ hour. Passing over the start lines, the 5th East Lancashires of 197 Brigade reached their first objective east of the village of Vendes and by 0800 had captured part of the village despite a determined defence encountered from the outset of the attack. Here the 5th East Lancashires were pinned down and prevented from further advance when by 2.30 in the afternoon an effective infantry counter-attack with tank support overran one company on the right and forced the withdrawal of the remaining forces of the occupying battalion back to their start line.

To the east, the 1/6th and the 5th South Staffords moved on their allotted objectives. The 1/6th captured Brettevillette little over an hour after starting out and by 0845 hours troops of the Battalion had advanced as far as Quediville. In likewise manner, the 5th South Staffords captured the orchards to the west of Granville sur Odon and by noon Les Nouillons was in their hands. Thus it was that by this time, all of the 177 Brigade's objectives had been achieved, but at a high price. Resistance was heavy and effective, the objective village remains were thickly mined with both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Furthermore, two thirds of the tanks in support of the 1/6th assault ‘brewed up’, to use the parlance of the tank men of at the time, in a British minefield that remained in place, despite assurances that clearance would have been completed in advance of the attack. The confusion of the fighting was compounded when many troops became disorientated and misdirected in the heavy morning mist . By 1330 hours tanks equipped with mine clearing flails began to enter the minefields at Quediville. This marked the close of Phase I of the attack.

Phase II was launched in the early evening with a 2/6th Battalion advance of the village of Noyers Bocage (Hereafter referred to as Noyers) and three quarters of an hour later the 6th North Staffords (under the command of 177 Brigade for this action) assaulted Haul des Forges. The 6th succeeded in taking their objective, but in the face of heavy opposition, after initially penetrating some way into the village, were forced to withdraw to the area around Noyers railway satation. On this day 177 Brigade took a total of 369 German prisoners, all soldiers of the 277 Infanterie Division.

During the remainder of the 16th July, on the hard pressed right, another assault on the Phase I objective was launched, this time by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, but their efforts were thwarted by the heavy and accurate mortar fire laid down by the defenders and little was achieved.

The following two days were focused on the concerted efforts of the 177 Infantry Brigade to take Noyers. A dawn attack on the village by the 1/6th and the 5th South Staffords fell someway short of reaching the station and the men were pinned down until 13.30 hours when the order came through to withdraw and reorganise. A further attack by the 5th was launched from the north east of the village but was repelled just inside the outskirts. A 1/6th South Staffords advance from Bretteville in the direction of Bordel failed under heavy defensive fire. After dark all troops were withdrawn in order to ‘soften up’ the village defences with shell and mortar fire.

The 17th also saw the 1/7th Royal Warwicks of the 197 Brigade with support from the 1st Norfolk Yeomanry achieve success in assaulting the phase I objectives. To drive home this success and to strengthen the 197 Brigade front, 176 Brigade moved on Bordel , but without great success. At this time H.Q. 1/7th Royal Warwickshire was hit by two large bombs which resulted in high casualty numbers.

Attempts to subdue Noyers were renewed at 10 am on the morning of 18th once again with the 1/6th and 5th South Staffords advancing on the fortified village. Despite strong, albeit depleted, armoured support, this action as well as another assault in the afternoon was unsuccessful and the forces of the 59th Division once again withdrew by evening to allow shells and mortar to resume their attempts to subdue the resilient defenders of Noyers.

Once again on the right, by nightfall, the 1/7th Royal Warwicks had occupied Ferme de Guiberon and reports came in from the 49th Infantry Division of German withdrawals across the front. The 7th South Staffords of 176 Brigade attacked, captured and held the area from Bordel up to la Seneviére.

After three days of heavy fighting the process of relieving the exhausted, battle weary troops in the line began. During the night of 18th July, 176 Infantry Brigade relieved 197 Brigade, thus allowing it to move into reserve positions. Elsewhere on the right, the 7th Royal Norfolks relieved the 1/7th Royal Warwicks.

On the 19th, the 49th Division occupied Vendes, after the enemy had withdrawn from the village. Plans for a renewed assault on Noyers, after 177 Brigade dawn patrols confirmed that the village was still held by the Germans, came to nothing.

At 1250 hours on the 19th July, the Corps Commander passed down orders to cease any further attempts to take Noyers and subsequent activities in the following days were restricted to aggressive patrolling across the front.

British footage of Operation Pomegranate (17th July 1944)

More detailed information on the fighting in which the soldiers of the South Staffordshire regiments were engaged is given a later post.

Detail of the German front line a week after 'Operation Pomegranate'

Operation Pomegranate - The Allies

49 (West Riding) Division

The 49 (West Riding) Division was committed into action at an early stage of the war when two brigades of the Division participated in an attempt of the 15th to 17th April 1940 to take the Norwegian ports of Trondheim and Narvik back from the control of the occupying German Army. The landings were a disaster and the units were withdrawn in May.

After the Norwegian landings, the 146 and 147 Brigades were transferred and stationed in Iceland, and it was from here that the famous Polar bear on an ice floe insignia originated. The third Divisional brigade, the 148th was reassigned as a training battalion outside of the 49th Division.

1942 saw the Division transferred back to the UK with the incorporation of 70th Brigade (reallocated from the disbanded 23 (Northumbrian) Division) into her ranks.

In the immediate aftermath of D Day, the 49 (West Riding) Division moved to Normandy as part of XXX Corps. After engaging the enemy, it was the traitorous British broadcaster William Joyce, better known as 'Lord Haw Haw' who referred to the Division as 'the Polar Bear Butchers', as a consequence of their reputation for tenacity and aggression in the field. Soldiers of the 49 Division took a grim pride in this epithet as evidenced by a Christmas card produced in 1944.

After the Normandy campaign, the 49th saw further action, most notably in the Arnhem region, as part of the First Canadian Army fighting in support of 'Operation Market Garden'.

The 49 (West Riding) Division is also a fundamental part of this narrative as after the disbandment of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division in August 1944, my Grandfather was transferred to the 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers (R.S.F.) which formed one infantry Division of 147 Brigade within the 49 (West Riding) Division.

59 (Staffordshire) Division

Positioned in the centre of the line of the Pomegranate front.

A follow-up formation described at length on this site.

53 (Welsh) Division

In many aspects, the World War II history of the 53 (Welsh) Division runs parallel to that of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division. Part of the Territorial Army from 1921 it was mobilised at the outbreak of the war in 1936 and detailed initially to protect the ports of South Wales. However, in October 1939 the 53rd transferred to Northern Ireland where it trained and also maintained a keen eye on the activities south of the border. In November 1941 it was replaced by the 59 (Staffordshire) Division who you may recall were dismayed to surrender their new transport and armour in the North East of England only to take on the tired equipment of 53rd (Welsh) in Ulster!

As with 59th, training continued apace with the Division spending a further period of time in the Welsh borders before being moved down into Kent to defend the south coast during the 1942-1943 period. Reorganisation occurred in October  1943, with the 71st Infantry Brigade taking the place of the 159th Infantry Brigade who became part of 11th Armoured Division. The Division then concentrated those aspects of training that would serve them best when the time came to take the fight to France.

The 53 (Welsh) Division landed in Normandy as a follow-up formation under the command of VII Corps on 28th June 1944, just a few days after the arrival of the 59th (Staffordshire) Division. After the Battle of Caen, the 53rd was taken under the command of VIII Corps at the tail end of Operation Epsom. Here the 53rd relieved units of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division in the salient. Operation Greenline followed which held up German forces that would otherwise have threatened the Goodwood assault to the east of Caen. 

Throughout the remainder of July, the 53rd Welsh were involved in bitter fighting in the Odon salient and suffered very heavy losses. Moving east the Division further advanced in early August in the direction of Falaise, crossing the Orne river at Grimbosq on 16th August. It was in an action on that day that Captain Tasker Watkins of the 1/5 Welsh Regiment earned the VC by leading his men in an infantry charge against superior numbers of the enemy as well as putting a German machine gun position out of action.

Captain Tasker Watkins VC

1/5 Welsh Regiment

53 (Welsh) Division

After the destruction of the 7th German Army in the Falaise Pocket on 21st August, the Division moved up to the River Seine to continue the rapid advance through France and Belgium. After the fall of Antwerp, the 53rd guarded the port and its surroundings before advancing into Holland on the commencement of Operation Market Garden, thereafter continuing to fight hard in the 'Island' area between Nijmegen and Arnhem. Of these places there will be much to say later as these were the battlefields also trodden by my Grandfather after August 1944 with the 11th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers. 

53 (Welsh) Division continued to see action in the Ardennes (Battle of the Bulge (16th December 1944 to 25th January 1945)). It saw some of its fiercest engagements in the closing months of the war as it took on the last desperate, but determined, stand by German paratroops in the Reichswald forest.

The Division reached Hamburg on 4th of May and the war came to an end. Soldiers of the Division were retained and formed part of the British Army of the Rhine.

In their 10 months of active service in North West Europe, the Division suffered 9,846 casualties, killed, wounded or missing.

The Bombing Of Caen - 7th July 1944

The ruins of Caen after the Allied aerial bombardment of 7th July 1944

The opening of 'Operation Charnwood' was preceded on the night of 7th July by the first involvement of Bomber Command in the Normandy campaign. In a tragic, and still much debated, episode in the Overlord story much of the ancient city of Caen was obliterated from the air.

The carpet bombing of the medieval city is to this day a highly controversial action on the part of the Allies. The strategic advantage gained by the bombing of the northern districts of Caen is questionable, given the resulting level of destruction and the high numbers of civilian casualties.

Between 21.50 and 22.30 hours on the evening of the 7th, a force of four-engined, heavy bombers totaling 467 Halifax's and Lancaster's flew over the north of the city. A combined payload of 2,560 tons of high explosive, incendiary and delayed-action bombs were dropped on the northern limits.

Flying at 2,500 metres, the intention was to complete bomb runs within a rectangular area measuring 4,000 yards by 1,500 yards. The target area was largely dictated by the insistence of Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris (perhaps now better known to history as 'Bomber Harris') that a 6,000 yard safety margin be in place from the position of the forward British and Canadian troops and the northern extremity of the target area. This was to be achieved through use of a system that had been successful in the raids over Berlin, whereby a Master Bomber marked the target area and then observed the progress and positioning of the subsequent attack from a higher altitude. From such a vantage point the Master Bomber could revisions and adjustments could be communicated to the Deputy Master Bomber below as the situation demanded to ensure the accuracy of bombing throughout the raid.

A Handley Page Halifax of No. 4 Group flies over the suburbs of Caen, France, during a major daylight raid to assist the Normandy land battle during Operation CHARNWOOD. 467 aircraft took part in the attack, which was originally intended to have bombed German strongpoints north of Caen, but the bombing area was eventually shifted nearer the city because of the proximity of Allied troops to the original targets. The resulting bombing devastated the northern suburbs © IWM (CL 347)
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205211589

The need for such a system was to control a phenomenon in which over time bomb loads tended to to be dropped earlier with the result that the inflicted damage would creep backwards from the intended target area. This was caused both by the fact that target markers became obscured in the inevitable flame and smoke of the raid and as a result of the urge for aircrews, in the face of heavy flack put up by a city's defences, to minimise the time spent over the target before turning for the home run.

In the Caen raid of 7th July, the consequences would have been catastrophic had such a 'creep back' occurred and brought payloads down on the Allied formations massed to the north of the city. Thus it was that the bombing had a very limited impact on the enemy troop and armour concentrations facing the 59th Division as the target area was well to the rear of the Germans in an area in which few military installations were located.

Map showing the target area for the 7th July bombing raid. It is evident that the bombing was concentrated well to the rear of the German defending formations

(map by EyeSerene)

In the event the raid had some impact upon the men of a detachment of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division. Additionally, the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend lost a mortar section and two tanks to the action.

Not easily measurable in terms of military advantage gained, but to the men of the 59th, who in a few short hours were to experience combat for the first time, the psychological and morale boosting effect of watching the RAF giving the 'hun' a pasting would have been immense.

On the other hand the casualties inflicted on the French civilian population was high. The Centre de Recherche d'Histoire Quantitative within the University of Caen estimated that 350 civilians lost their lives in the raid of the night of the 7th and in the fighting that ensued in the city on the following day. This figure is high when one considers that three quarters of Caen's peacetime population had been evacuated from the city at this point in time.

A less emotive consequence of the raid was the fact that by reducing the northern fringes of the city to rubble, the Allies created a cityscape that was easy to defend effectively by the German units that emerged from the deep defences within the city. Moreover, the level of destruction impeded movement into the city, slowing progress and reducing the penetration of the Allied forces into Caen on the tail of the German withdrawal across the River Orne.

It comes as no surprise that my Grandfather talked of this night as he would not as yet experienced anything in war even remotely as powerful and dramatic as the destruction of Caen from the air. During the raid, he would have been approximately 6 miles north of the city

A British soldier carries a little girl through the devastation of Caen, 10 July 1944 © IWM (B 6781)
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205206008