A road in the Falaise Pocket choked with bodies and destroyed vehicles
As the South Staffordshire regiments were coming to terms
with the news that the 59th Division and their associated regiments
were to be disbanded, the encirclement of German Army Group B was nearing completion.
The last action in which the 5th South
Staffordshire Regiment engaged the enemy in the Menil Hermai and Rabodanges
area took them some 9 miles south of
Falaise in positions approximately equidistant from Falaise and Argentan, towns
near to the mouth of the notorious ‘Falaise Pocket’.
Given the involvement of the 59 (Staffordshire) division in
the encirclement, it is appropriate to describe some of the drama that played
out in the Falaise-Argentan sector. The Battle of Falaise brought the Battle of
Normandy to a conclusion and the liberation of Paris on the 25th
August closed Operation Overlord.
The town of Faliase was also an entry on the envelope upon
which my Grandfather detailed his passage across north west Europe.
Operation Cobra in July had allowed the huge US forces to
breakout of the Normandy bridgehead into Brittany enabling rapid progress to
the south and south east by General Patton’s 3rd Army, now unhindered
by the Normandy bocage. To the north, the 1st Canadian Army were
pressing south east from Caen towards Falaise whilst the 2nd British
Army maintained pressure further west.
Location of opposing forces in the area of Falaise between 8th to 17th August 1944
(image: EyeSerene)
Plans were afoot to trap the German forces to the west of
the Seine. The original plan was to execute a long encirclement with 21st
Army Group (1st Canadian and 2nd British armies) pivoting
to the left from Falaise to reach the Seine whilst US 3rd Army would
block a breakout to the south, thereby trapping German Army Group B (the 7th
German Army and the 5th Panzer Army) between the rivers Seine and
Loire.
The German High Command recognised the risk of encirclement
and Hitler responded to the threat by ordering Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge
to punch a hole in the US 1st Army front in a major offensive action
between Mortain and Avranches.
Of this offensive Hitler wrote
‘The decision in the Battle
of France depends on the success of the Avraches attack. The commander in the
west has a unique opportunity, which will never return, to drive into an
extremely exposed enemy area and thereby to change the situation completely’.
The offensive was launched on 7th August. The
Allies, forewarned by Ultra information, neutralised the attack within 24 hours
and the action, known as Operation Lüttich, ceased on 10th August.
The intended breakout failed and only served to drive the German armour of Army
Group B deeper into the pocket.
In the immediate wake of Operation Lüttich, General Bradley
recorded
‘This is an opportunity that comes to a commander not more than once
in a century. We’re about to destroy an entire hostile army and go all the way
from here to the German border’.
Operation Totalise and then Operation Tractable took the
Canadians into the town of Falaise which was secured by the 17th
August. On the same day Hitler relieved von Kluge of his command and replaced
him with Feldmarschall Walter Model. Von Kluge, blamed for the failure of the
German Army in the west and implicated in the 20th July plot to assassinate
Hitler, committed suicide in Metz two days later.
Back in the field, XV US Corps, which formed the lower jaw
of the trap reached positions overlooking the town of Argentan. The possibility
existed to close the gap with the coming together of the Canadians and Poles
from the north and the Americans from the south. However, Patton’s orders to
advance beyond Argentan were countermanded by General Bradley. The rationale
for this decision has been hotly debated since 1944.
Numerous reasons have been given for the order to stop the
XV advance that would close the pocket thereby cutting off the escape route to
the east for the remaining forces of the 7th German Army and the 5th
Panzer Army.
One explanation proffered by Bradley himself after the war
stated that a meeting of the British/Canadian and US units between Falaise and
Argentan would have been a ‘dangerous and uncontrollable maneuver’ which in the
words of General Eisenhower might have resulted in a ‘calamatous battle between
friends’. Alternatively, the delicate politics associated with maintaining the
Allied coalition may have lead to a reluctance to order US forces across the
international army boundary. A thoroughly feasible reason was a purely military
consideration. Four divisions of US XV Corps were extended over a broad front.
To further thin the line in order to close the gap posed a considerable risk
given that the remnants of no less than nineteen German divisions were poised
to ‘stampede’ east to escape the pocket. This could have lead to the annihilation
of the Corps. Bradley also said of this decision that he would prefer to have ‘a
solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise’.
Closure of the Pocket 17th to 21st August 1944
(note the position of the 59 (Staffordshire) Division at the base of the Pocket
On 17th August the Allies proceeded to close the
gap. On 18th August the 4th Canadian Armoured Division seized
the village of Trun whilst formations of the Polish Armoured Division captured
Chambois, meeting up with US and French troops coming from the south.
Whilst in a desperate predicament, the German forces
continued to show a great tenacity in battle. On 19th August an
armoured column of 2nd Panzer Division broke through the line in the
Canadian held position at St Lambert. In doing so they facilitated the escape
of thousands of troops by keeping the road open for a full six hours until
darkness fell. In this time, other units converged in the Dives river which ran across the mouth of the pocket.
On the 19th August, the Poles moved north east
from Chambois to take the high ground of Hill 262 from where they could direct
accurate artillery fire onto the German armoured columns formed up in the
pocket. On the same day, elements of two Panzer divisions launched attacks on
the Polish positions from outside of the pocket whilst from the interior
further Panzer divisions broke through the Polish lines and opened up a
corridor through which an estimated 10,000 further German troops escaped. The
linking of Polish and Canadian forces on 21st August finally closed
the gap and sealed the pocket.
The encirclement of the remaining forces of German Army
Group B was without doubt a decisive and crushing defeat. In the chaos of those
August days an accurate determination of the extent of the German losses was not
possible and estimates vary widely depending on the source of the information.
However, in general terms it is accepted that between 80,000 to 100,000 troops
were encircled within the pocket of whom 10,000 to 15,000 were killed, 40,000
to 50,000 were taken prisoner of war and an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 escaped
to the east out of the pocket.
On visiting the Falaise area shortly after the conclusion of
the action General Eisenhower described the scene thus
‘The battlefield at
Falaise was unquestioningly one of the greatest ‘killing fields’ of any of the
war areas. Forty eight hours after the closing of the gap I was conducted
through it on foot, to encounter scenes that could be described only by Dante.
It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards at a time, stepping on nothing
but dead and decaying flesh’.
Devastating though the losses to the German army were in
terms of men, armour and other essential equipment, the fact that between
20,000 and 50,000 men were able to escape out of the pocket prior to the
closure was crucial. Regrouped, these men were to form the basis of the
determined and effective resistance that the Allies were to experience as the
fighting continued in the direction of Berlin, across Belgium and Holland.
