The 59 Division advance started with a 197 Brigade action in the Juvigny area, approximately three miles to the north of Noyers. Tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment were in support. The attack progressed well and thorough patrols were maintained to ensure that enemy withdrawals did not go unnoticed. A German counter attack in the same area was repelled by the 7th Royal Warwicks.
By 1st August the 197 Bridage sector had quietened down to the extent that the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers were withdrawn, but an increase in enemy activity rapidly brought them back into the line. Fierce local fighting continued and in three days of combat the toll on 197 Brigade was high at 19 officers and 383 other ranks killed, wounded or missing. However, the German armour was held in the area well away from the U.S. advance further to the west.
From 3rd August intelligence reports indicated significant enemy withdrawals were taking place from the XII Corps front and the formations of 59 Division pressed the advance towards the Orne. 197 Brigade were in action once again, advancing to take the high ground to the immediate north east of Villers-Bocage. Resistance was light, but rear guard pockets of Germans along with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines continued to hamper the progress of the British soldiers. By 3pm on 4th August, one company of the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers entered the ruins of Villers-Bocage, where the R.A.F. had completed the destruction started by the artillery. 176 Brigade passed through the village.
Meanwhile, 177 Brigade finally occupied Noyers which had eluded them over the previous weeks and taken such a heavy toll across its ranks. By night, 176 Brigade controlled the high ground five miles to the south east of Villers-Bocage. 59 Recce Regiment were to be found in Landes, three miles to the east of the village and 177 were positioned on the road between Villers-Bocage and Noyers. 197 were now in reserve.
At this point, the 59th suffered a blow when 31 Tank Brigade were replaced by 34 Tank Brigade under the divisional command. Thus a close tank crew/infantry understanding that had developed in the previous two weeks of fighting was lost. This loss of learnt close cooperation would result in an increase in casualty figures within the Division in the coming days.